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I. INTRODUCTION

"L'injustice d lafin produit l'indipendance."

1. VOLTAIRE, TANCRtDE act IV, sc. 6. Translated, this means: Injustice in the
end produces independence. Injustice in the End ProducesIndependence, GOOGLE
TRANSLATE,
http://translate.google.com/#auto/en/L'injustice%20%201a%20f
in%20produit%201'ind6pendance.
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On November 29, 1947, the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly adopted resolution 181.2 The resolution recommended that
the United Kingdom partition the Palestine Mandate into Jewish and
Arab states. 3 Since adopting the resolution, acts of war and terror
have ravaged the region.4 The violence has yet to produce a
permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or stability to the
region generally. 5 Long-term diplomatic solutions have proven
equally ineffective. 6 The failure of a diplomatic solution to the
problem lends credence to a potential judicial solution to the
Palestinian question.
Article 33(1) of the UN Charter indicates the importance of
settling disputes peacefully, and using international adjudication as a
mechanism to achieve peaceful solutions.7 Article 92 of the UN
Charter created the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the
preeminent international tribunal to handle disputes between the States
of the world.8 However, the ICJ's ability to issue binding decisions is
limited to disputes between States.9 Therefore, statehood is necessary

2. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Supp. No. 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181
(Nov. 29, 1947).
3. Id.
News,
BBC
of
Conflict,
A
History
generally
4. See
(last
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle-east/03/v3_ip-timeline/html/
visited Sept. 29, 2013) (describing how, since 1890, there have been at least twentyfive specific instances of conflict between the "Israelis" and "Palestinians.").
5. See Greg Myre, Is the Middle East Conflict Getting Even Tougher to
Solve?, PARALLELS (Aug. 14, 2013 7:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
parallels/2013/08/13/211711863/is-the-middle-east-conflict-getting-even-tougherto-solve.
6. See id.
7. UN Charter art. 33, para. 1. ("The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
shall, first of all seek a solution by negotiation, mediation,

...

arbitration, . . . [or]

judicial settlement . ...
.).
8. Id. art. 92.
9. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, para. 1, June 26, 1945,
15 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. While the ICJ does have the authority to
issue advisory opinions, advisory decisions are not legally binding. Id. art. 65, para.
1; see UN Charter art. 96. 2 Oellers-Frahm, Article 96, in THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1975, 1987 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed.
2002) [hereinafter UN CHARTER COMMENTARY ART. 96].
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for effective ICJ jurisprudence and peaceful solutions to international
disputes.
The international community has grappled with the issue of
Palestinian statehood for decades.' 0 Due to Palestine's admission to
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) as a member state, and the UN General Assembly
recognizing Palestine as a "[n]on-member State Observer," the
argument for Palestinian Statehood has never been stronger." But if
Palestine could be considered a State under international law, could it
possibly bring a dispute to the ICJ?
This Comment attempts to clarify the issues surrounding
Palestine's ability to access the ICJ, and concludes that Palestine is a
State for three reasons.
First, Palestine arguably satisfies the
Montevideo Criteria for statehood.12
Second, the international
community of States has collectively recognized Palestinian
statehood. 13 Finally, Palestine is entitled to invoke the doctrine of
self-determination to facilitate statehood.14 Therefore, Palestine is a
State that should be able to bring contentious cases before the ICJ.
But, even if Palestine cannot bring contentious cases to the ICJ, the
ICJ's advisory jurisprudence can still be of some use to Palestine.
Section II of this Article discusses whether Palestine can be
considered a State under international law. Without statehood,
Palestine cannot be a party in a contentious case and can only enjoy
the limited relief of the ICJ's advisory power.15
Next, assuming Palestine is a State, section III of this Article
analyzes whether Palestine can bring a contentious case to the ICJ.
10. Myre, supra note 5.
11. See infra Part II.
12. The Montevideo Criteria are the traditional criteria needed under
customary international law, for an entity to be considered a state. See infra Part
II.A.
13. Collective Recognition allows for a looser application of the
aforementioned Montevideo criteria. See infra Part II.B.
14. Only certain entities are enabled to invoke the doctrine of selfdetermination to achieve statehood. See infra Part II.C.3.
15. ICJ contentious cases are distinguishable from ICJ advisory opinions
because only contentious cases are legally binding on the parties. Compare UN
Charter art. 94 (requiring parties to comply with contentious case judgments in good
faith), with UN CHARTER COMMENTARY ART. 96, supra note 9 (stating that advisory
opinions are not legally binding).
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Under the umbrella of contentious case adjudication there are three
avenues Palestine can take to bring a case before the ICJ. First,
Palestine could become a "Member State" to the UN. 16 Second,
Palestine could become a party to the ICJ Statute." Third, Palestine
could petition the United Nations Security Council (SC) to allow it to
bring a single dispute before the ICJ.' 8 Each option is under the
auspices of the SC. While each of these options would give the ICJ
jurisdiction over Palestine, the ICJ would also need to have
jurisdiction over the State opposing Palestine in the dispute. 19
Section IV examines Palestine's options for utilizing the ICJ's
advisory jurisprudence, and the efficacy of such an opinion. Finally,
section V reemphasizes that Palestine's ability to litigate in the ICJ, as
well as the enforceability of an ICJ judgment or advisory opinion, lies
in the hands of the SC. The threshold issue, however, is whether
Palestine is a state, as that determination influences the subsequent
analysis.
II. THE CASE FOR PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD

Under Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, only States can be
parties before the ICJ. 20 Although many scholars, including judges
who have served on the ICJ, believe that the requirement is not
compatible with the current international system, statehood remains a
prerequisite for parties to contentious cases wishing to appear before
the ICJ. 2 1 Therefore, the threshold issue is whether Palestine is a State
under international law.2 2
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See UN Charter art. 93.
ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 35, para. 1.
S.C Res. 9, U.N. S/RES/9 (Oct. 15, 1946).
ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36.
Id. art. 34(1).

21.

Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Article 34, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT OF JUSTICE 585, 604-05 (Andreas Zimmermann et. al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
22. While there is no formally agreed upon definition of what a State is this
paper will argue that Palestine is a State under customary international law.
Customary international law is widespread and consistent state practice that is taken
out of a legal obligation, or opinion juris. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 6, 8 (7th ed. 2008) (noting how state practice that is not
taken out of a sense of a legal obligation does not qualify as a customary
international law norm); see ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 38, para. 1(b).
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A. PalestineSatisfies the Criteriafor Statehood under
InternationalLaw
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention (Montevideo Criteria)
sets forth the best-known formula for statehood.23 The Montevideo
Criteria are premised on the principle of effective control over a
territorial entity, 24 and provide the most succinct standard when
evaluating whether an entity is a State. 25 If Palestine is to be
considered a State under international law, it must satisfy to some
degree the Montevideo Criteria.
In addition to the Montevideo Criteria, the notion of statehood
recognition and the right to self-determination play a role in
establishing Palestine as a State.2 6 Thus, Palestine could overcome
any deficiencies regarding the Montevideo Criteria through the
international community's collective recognition of Palestine as a
State, and its right to Self-Determination. 27
23. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45

(2d ed. 2006); see Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933,
164 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] ("The state as a person of
international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other states."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987) (noting in Comment (a) that The

Montevideo Convention is seen as customary international law with respect to
statehood ).
24. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 46.

25. Thomas Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its
Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 414 (1999). However, scholars

debate whether the Montevideo Criteria contain a sufficient definition of statehood.
Scholars note that other factors besides those reflected in the Montevideo
Convention are equally if not more important than the four factors in article 1. Id. at
437. Such factors include the ability of an entity to observe human rights standards,
and maintain a market economy. Conclusions of the Presidency (EC) SN 180/1/93
REV I of June 21-22 1993 (noting that to become a Member State of the European
Union, an entity must satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria, which requires, among other
things, an entity to observe human rights standards and maintain a market
economy); see also The Treaty of Maastricht: Treaty on European Union (EU), Feb.
7, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253 (establishing the current institutional setup of
the European Union).
26.

JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW 141 (8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
27. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 206 (6th ed. 2008).
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1. The Montevideo Criteriaappliedto Palestine
To satisfy the Montevideo Criteria, Palestine must possess a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the
capacity to enter into relations with other States. 2 8 A permanent
population can be defined as an aggregate of individuals who,
together, form a community. 29 Arguably, Palestine has a permanent
population, if the Palestinian populations in the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank are taken into consideration. 30 Additionally, Palestine
must have a government that controls a defined territory. 3 1 A State's
creation depends "upon the exercise of full governmental powers with
respect to some area of territory." 32 While creation of a State depends
on the government exercising power over some area of territory, there
is no rule prescribing how much territory must actually be
controlled.33 Arguably, because the UN called for the partition of
28. See supra note 23.
29. LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
30. See Knox v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 434
(S.D.N.Y. March 1, 2004) (stating the defendant's contention that it "is an
indisputable fact that there has been a permanent population in Palestine for over
two millennia."); see also John Quigley, The Israel-PLOInterim Agreements: Are
They Treaties?, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 717, 724 (1997) (stating that Palestine
appears to satisfy the criterion of controlling a territory's population).
31. While the criteria "defined territory" and "government" are separate
elements of the Montevideo Convention, scholars have indicated that the two
elements really form the "effective control principle." See CRAWFORD, supra note
23; SHAW, supra note 27. Thus, they will be discussed together here.
32. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 46; see Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 1
R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 71.
33. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 46; see also Thomas M. Franck & Paul
Hoffman, The Right to Self-Determination in Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 331, 383-84 (1976) (noting that "infinitesimal smallness has never been
seen as a reason to deny self-determination to a population."). Furthermore, the ICJ
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) both note that
international law does not require a State's boundaries to be fully defined. See
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 49, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (noting that archipelagic States do not need contiguous territory to be
considered a state, and possess the same rights as States that have contiguous
territory); North Sea Continental Shelf (F. R. G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 45 (Feb.
20) (holding that entities do not require fully defined frontiers to satisfy the defined
territoryaspect of statehood).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013

7

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2013], Art. 4

80

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

British-mandated Palestine, Palestine has a defined territory
comprised of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. 34
Additionally, the requirement of an effective government may be
the central element regarding a claim to statehood.35 International law
defines government as "the extent of governmental power exercised,
or capable of being exercised, with respect to some territory and
population."3 6 Under the Interim Agreement,3 7 the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) administers the Gaza Strip, and the
West Bank's major towns, thus satisfying the effective government
requirement for Palestine. 38

34. Knox, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 434 (arguing this exact point by the defendants,
who admit that Palestine's borders have occasionally changed and there is some
dispute as to their exact contours).
35. See BROWNLIE,supra note 22, at 71; CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 55.
36. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 56.
37. See Quigley, supra note 30, at 724. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement initiated a peace process, and declared the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) the representative of the Palestinian people. See The IsraeliPalestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Isr.-PLO, Sept. 28,
1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/
Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/THE+ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN+INTERIM
+AGREEMENT.htm.
38. Quigley, supra note 30, at 724. The government control requirement is
relaxed in international practice where a putative State is seen as having a right to
statehood and where no entity is competing for statehood in the same territory. Id.
The government criterion concerning Palestine draws much dispute, because as of
August 2012, the Palestine National Authority controls the West Bank, while the
Hamas government controls the Gaza Strip. See JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL34074, THE PALESTINIANS: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 1 (2012).

Thus, two entities purport to control Palestine, which tends to negate the effective
control principle. However, entities have gained or retained statehood and UN
membership in the absence of an effective government. See G.A. Res. 67/502, U.N.
Doc. A/67/502 (Oct. 24, 2012) (permitting the Central African Republic, the
Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Somalia to vote without
governments, for instances where entities retained statehood); Eric Ting-Lun Huang,
Taiwan's Status in a Changing World: United Nations Representation and
Membershipfor Taiwan, 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 55, 71 (2003) (discussing
how the United Nations admitted Congo as a "member state" when, at the time,
Congo had no effective government) see also G.A. Res. 1480, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/1480 (Sept. 20, 1960) (admitting the Congo to the UN at a time that it did
not have an effective government).
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Finally, a State must have the capacity to enter into relations with
other States to qualify as a State under international law. 39 A State's
capacity to enter into relations is independent of its recognition by
other States. 40 Additionally, a State's capacity or ability to engage
other States depends on the power of the internal government over its
people and land.4 1
The State of Palestine is a member of several international
organizations, including UNESCO and the Arab League, and is also a
"Non-Member Observer State" to the UN. 4 2 Palestine, as a member
of these organizations, demonstrates that it has the ability to enter into
relations with other States.43
An argument negating Palestine's capacity to enter into relations,
however, is that other parties purport to sign treaties on Palestine's
behalf.44 But, nonetheless, based on Palestine's membership in
39. Montevideo Convention, supra note 23, art. 1(d). Only the capacity to
enter into relations is relevant; actually doing so is not required. CRAWFORD, supra
note 23, at 61.
40. Montevideo Convention, supra note 23, art. 3; CRAWFORD, supra note 23,
at 61.
41. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 62.
42. Press Release, General Assembly Grants Palestine Non-Member Observer
State Status at UN, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov. 29, 2012); General
Conference Admits Palestine as UNESCO Member, UNESCOPRESS (Oct. 31,
2011)
[hereinafter
Palestine
Admitted
to
UNESCO],
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/general
conference admits-palestine as unesco member state/. In the League of Arab
States, the State of Palestine seceded the seat of the PLO following the 1988
Palestinian Declaration of Independence. See Member States, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB

STATES,
http://www.lasportal.org/wps/portal/las-en/inner/!ut/p/c5/vZLLjo
JAFES-xQ8wDQOoLNEG5B loRGRDAAEBpRWNPL5MJnFbHQ2xlvLStlTiwlhmNTEj7KI7yVp4hMIQLilkOC4PusyFI8lgVIhUmlTh5C
ymcnfvb55TpHQgoNsLVcFHHenSrEY8WSntv3HYmkgbP28IbWhm4cgYs3XW
rLuT1sYgVv71yl7nqhSra88wg3WwGcNZM 8J3xGefpO-90JECexAu_Q5maZUBPOSllDIYfA-2DjtyyZjiKL-R7Lpz7KOkBYnEgyLXW32Q89ImaHx
F1OTKU2r6xEgNyhWPt6p5C2356kQAzmTdkai8BDfGoY al3V5LWJnmnbJLsdp
St6krcgdNglOUWILF8s8O6ZpeBEXudl xA-UPM2ZrHj5mYRpSO8xBpCdC6IilnTGuE7CFOgLUh5wxczttH6fLOr5hCnMlAH9YDmg!/dl3/d3/L2dBISEvZOFBIS9nQSEh/?pcid=69747e00425e3086ba20fbcO
e4251219 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
43. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 23, art. 1(d).
44. The PLO is the party to numerous international agreements, presumably on
behalf of the State of Palestine, including the Free Trade Agreement with the
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international organizations, there is evidence demonstrating that
Palestine has the capacity to enter into relations with other States,
exemplifying its independence.
2. Independence
Inextricably linked to the capacity to enter into relations with
other States and the notion of a government that effectively controls a
populated territory is the criterion of independence.
Although
independence is not expressly provided for in the Montevideo Criteria,
it encompasses the elements of the Montevideo Criteria. 45 The two
main elements of independence are: (1) the existence of a separate
entity within reasonably coherent frontiers, and (2) the freedom from
subjection to the authority of other States.4 6
The PLO and Hamas each control a substantial and coherent
territory, as well as the populace of Palestine.4 7 Additionally, political
actors within Palestine, and not other States, enter into international
agreements and organizations on Palestine's behalf.4 8 While it would
be naive to declare that Palestine indisputably satisfies the
Montevideo Criteria and qualifies as an independent State, it is at least
plausible that Palestine qualifies as a State under international law. In

European Union. See Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade
and Cooperation Between the European Community, of the One Part, and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the Benefit of the Palestinian Authority
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the Other Part, Eur. Union-PLO, Feb. 24,
1997, 1997 O.J. (L 187) 3 [hereinafter Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association
Agreement], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/june/tradoc
117751.pdf. In contrast, the Palestine National Authority is the party to the Union
for the Mediterranean, on behalf of Palestine. See Barcelona Declaration Adopted at
the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Nov. 27-28, 1995 [hereinafter Barcelona
Declaration], available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bden.pdf.
45. See Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 1 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928) ("Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise
therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.").
46. Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion, 1931
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41, at 57-58 (Sept. 5); CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 66.
47. Zanotti, supra note 38, at 4; Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State of
Palestine, 1 EUR. J. INT'L LAW 301, 302 (1990).
48. Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement, supra note 44;
Barcelona Declaration, supra note 44.
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addition, the concept of State recognition may strengthen Palestine's
status as a State under international law.
B.

The Effects of Collective Recognition by the International
Community

Recognition of statehood by other States is related to, but distinct
from, an entity achieving statehood.4 9 In earlier times, "statehood
recognition was considered . .. to be an essential element of
statehood . . . ."o The more international recognition a State receives,

the less strictly the Montevideo Criteria are applied.5
Collective
recognition could assist an entity that is otherwise missing some of the
Montevideo Criteria, and alternatively, collective non-recognition
could inhibit recognition based on the Criteria. 52 Accordingly, even if
Palestine does not completely satisfy the Montevideo Criteria, it
should be entitled to a looser application of the Criteria because of the
international community's overwhelming recognition of Palestine as a
State.53

49. John Cerone, The UN and the Status ofPalestine-Disentanglingthe Legal
Issues, 15 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTs 26 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/26/un-and-status-palestine%E2%80%93-disentangling-legal-issues [hereinafter DisentanglingLegal Issues].
50. Id. There are two theoretical frameworks concerning statehood
recognition: (1) the constitutive theory, and (2) the declaratory theory. BROWNLIE,
supra note 22, at 86; CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 19, 22. The constitutive theory
holds that a State only becomes a State via recognition by other States. Id. at 19.
The declaratory theory holds that the recognition of a new State is a political act
independent of the new state's existence. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 22. Under
the declaratory theory recognition merely declares that an entity satisfies the
objective Montevideo Criteria. DisentanglingLegal Issues, supra note 49.
51. DisentanglingLegal Issues, supra note 49.
52. Id.
53. Palestine's membership to UNESCO, and the GA resolution labeling
Palestine a "Non-Member State" demonstrates the international community's
collective recognition of Palestine as a State. Individual States have also unilaterally
recognized Palestine as a State outside of UN dealings. See, e.g., Israel News,
Argentina, Uruguay Recognize Palestinian State, YNETNEWS (Dec. 6, 2010 22:06
PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3995297,00.html.
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UNESCO Admitted Palestineas a Member State

On October 31, 2011, UNESCO admitted Palestine as a Member
State.54 Notably, Article II of UNESCO's constitution distinguishes
non-UN States responsible for their international relations from
territories that are not.5 Pursuant to UNESCO's Constitution, 107 of
the 121 present voting Member States voted in favor of Palestine
being admitted as a Member State. 5 6 Overall, fifty-eight percent of
UNESCO's 185 member states supported Palestine's membership
bid.57
Under UNESCO's rules of procedure, members vote to adopt
conventions and recommendations submitted by UNESCO's General
Conference. 58 Thus, Palestine, as a Member State, has authority equal
54. PalestineAdmitted to UNESCO, supra note 42. Palestine officially joined
UNESCO as a Member State on November 23, 2011. LuISA BLANCHFIELD &
MARJORIE ANN BROWNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42999, The United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 6 (2013), availableat
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42999.pdf. UNESCO is a specialized UN agency
that focuses on building peace among cultures "by promoting collaboration
among ... nation states through education ... [and] science . . . ." United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Constitution of
UNESCO, art. I, para. 1 (Nov. 16, 1945) [hereinafter UNESCO Constitution]. The
purposes of UNESCO are important because it sets the scope for an ICJ advisory
opinion. See infra Part IV.A.1. Membership in UNESCO is not dependent on
membership to the UN, but a Member State of the UN is entitled to membership in
UNESCO. UNESCO Constitution, supra, art. II, para. 1; see id. para. 2.
55. UNESCO Constitution, supra note 54, art. II, paras. 2-3. Thus, UNESCO
expressly differentiates States from entities that do not control their international
relations. This distinction is important when comparing Palestine to entities that are
not States.
56. See Palestine Admitted to UNESCO, supra note 54 (fifty-two present
Member States abstained from the vote); see also UNESCO Constitution, supra note
54, art. II paras. 2-3 (requiring a two-thirds majority vote for admission to UNESCO
admission requirements).
57. John Cerone, Legal Implications of the UN General Assembly Vote to
Accord Palestine the Status of Observer State, 16 AM.Soc'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS 37
(Dec. 7, 2012) available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/37/legalimplications-un-general-assembly-vote-accord-palestine-status[hereinafter Legal
Implications].
58. UNESCO Constitution, supra note 54, art. IV, para. 4. UNESCO's
General Conference consists of the representatives of the Member States. Id. art.
IV, para. 1.
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to that of "Confirmed States" in the organization, such as the United
States, whose statehood is undisputed.5 9 Consequently, Palestine has
equal ability to vote for or against actions taken by UNESCO, which
confirms Palestine's ability to act like a State. To bolster the position
that membership in UNESCO confirms Palestinian statehood, it is
useful to briefly compare the results of the recent UN general
Assembly (GA) vote.
2.

The UnitedNations GeneralAssembly Recognizes Palestine
as a Non-Member State

On November 29, 2012, the GA voted to accord Palestine the
status of "Non-Member Observer State." 60 Prior to receiving this
status, the UN recognized Palestine as an "Entity." 6' Although
Palestine's new designation as a "Non-Member Observer State" does
not include new procedural rights within the UN,6 2 the international
community's collective recognition of Palestine as a State is
significant. The GA affirmatively chose to recognize Palestine as
"Non-Member Observer State," versus a type of Non-State observer
such as an "Entity." 63 The GA's discretion to place Palestine in the
"Non-Member State" category further demonstrates that some in the

59. Member

States

of

the

United

Nations,

UNITED

NATIONS,

http://www.un.org/en/members/#p (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
60. Status of Palestine in the United Nations, G.A. Res. 67/19, T 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/67/19 (Nov. 29, 2012). The UN "Blue Book" of the UN Protocol and
Liaison Service sets forth several observer categories that maintain permanent
observer missions at UN Headquarters. Protocol and Liaison Service, Permanent
Missions to the United Nations, at vi-vii, U.N. Doc. ST/PLS/SER A/302 (Dec. 2012)
[hereinafter UN Blue Book]. These observer designations include: "Non-member
States;" "Inter-governmental organizations;" "Other entities;" and "Specialized
agencies and related organizations." Id.
61. In the most recent UN Blue Book, the category of "entity" is not listed. See
UN Blue Book, supra note 60. Only the categories noted in the above footnote are
mentioned in the latest version of UN Blue Book. Id.
62. Legal Implications, supra note 58.
63. G.A. Res. 67/19, supra note 60, T 2. The UN affirmatively chooses to
recognize different types of observers, and there exist several observer categories in
the UN. See UN Blue Book, supra note 60 (noting the various UN observer
statuses); infra note 61.
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international community accept Palestine as a State, rather than some
other type of international actor. 6
Arguably, the best arbiter of statehood is the collective
recognition of a State's existence by a majority of other States.
Collective recognition, as opposed to unilateral recognition, dissipates
the concern that statehood recognition is a political act.65 The sheer
number of States that recognize Palestine as a State ensures that its
statehood is not determined by a single State or a small group of
States. 66 This is precisely the outcome of the GA vote that named
Palestine a "Non-Member Observer State" to the UN. 6 7
Article 18(2) of the UN Charter requires that "important
questions" shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the GA.68 One of
these "important questions" is the admission of new Members to the
UN. 69 If Palestine could pass the first obstacle to UN membership
(the SC recommendation to the GA that a State should be considered
for membership), Palestine would currently have the two-thirds
majority required for admission to the UN. 7 0

64. Accordingly, by giving Palestine "Non-Member State" status, UN Member
States either applied the Montevideo Criteria to Palestine, or disregarded the criteria
as necessary for statehood, making the Criteria little more then a theoretical
achievement.
65. See BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 94.
66. This is precisely the stance that critics of the constitutive theory take
concerning statehood recognition. See SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1947).
67. See Legal Implications,supra note 57 ("[T]he mere fact that the resolution
was adopted constitutes a determination by the UN's most representative political
organ that Palestine is a state.") (emphasis added). More States recognized Palestine
as a State in the GA vote than in the vote admitting it to UNESCO as a Member
State. ComparePalestineAdmitted to UNESCO, supra note 55 (calculating that 107
of 173 members of the UNESCO General Conference, or 61.8%, voted to admit
Palestine as a UNESCO Member), with Legal Implications, supra note 57
(calculating that 138 of 193 of the UN Member States, or 71.5%, voted to make
Palestine a "Non-Member Observer State").
68. See UN Charter art. 18, para. 2.
6 9. Id.
70. These UN procedural standpoints are distinct from the importance of the
international community's recognition of Palestine as a State. DisentanglingLegal
Issues, supra note 49.
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PalestineHas a Right to Self-Determination

If Palestine is entitled to self-determination, its claim to statehood
might be strengthened. The United Nations is founded on developing
"friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... ."7 1 The main
components of self-determination are internal and external selfdetermination. 72 The Internal component of self-determination refers
to a people,73 territorialintegrity,74 and the ability to participate in
government. 75 The External component of self-determination refers
to a territory and people who were, or are governed, by a third State,
either in the colonial context or under military occupation. 76 if
Palestine is entitled to the right of self-determination, Palestine may
able to legally secede from Israel. 7 In addition, Palestine can be
considered a former colonial territory, thus invoking the external
prong of self-determination.
The right to external self-determination is present in the West
Bank because the Palestine National Authority works with the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) in administering the Palestinian people in the
West Bank.
The situation in the West Bank is an example of a
"militarily occupied territory," satisfying both the internal and
external prongs of self-determination. The external prong is satisfied
because the Palestinian people are under IDF military occupation.
In addition, if Palestine is considered a colonial territory, Palestine
has a right to "external" self-determination based on the right to self-

71.

UN Charter art. 1, para. 2; 1 Stefan Oeter, Self-Determination, in THE

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 315, 315 (Bruno Simma et. al.

eds., 3d ed. 2012).
72. Oeter, supra note 71, at 327-29.
73. A people is defined as a "group of persons bound together by common
objective characteristics, like language, culture, religion, [and] race,

. .

. as long as

such a group also has a common (subjective) understanding of belonging together
and being distinct from all the other surrounding groups." Id. at 325.
74. "Territorial Integrity" refers to a people submitting to a common authority.
Oeter, supra note 71, at 327-28.
75. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 126 (Can.).
76. Id. para. 138.
77. See id. paras. 122, 132-35.
78. Zanotti, supra note 38, at 19.
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determination being accorded to all peoples, and the grant of
independence to colonial peoples by the GA. 79 The Gaza Strip may
still be considered as subject to colonial control, because Israeli
military forces routinely run operations and maintain permanent posts
throughout the West Bank's borders. 80 This presence may satisfy the
external prong of self-determination.
Many scholars agree that "self-determination" is a preemptory, or
jus cogens, norm of international law. 8 ' Under international law, no
deviation is permitted from jus cogens norms. 82 The ICJ noted, "the
right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter
and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes
character . . . ."83 An obligation of erga omnes character is an
obligation owed by all States to every other State. 84 Appropriately,
self-determination as a "purpose or principle of the UN Charter,
constitutes a legally binding norm for all member states of the United
Nations." 85 Accordingly, Palestine should be able to invoke the right
to external self-determination, and, given the State practice in the UN,
should be entitled to make its own decision about statehood.8 6
79. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 1 2 U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1990) ("All
peoples have the right to self-determination.").
80. Zanotti, supra note 38, at 19.
Espiell, Self-Determination and Jus Cogens, in UN
81. H.G.
LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 167, 167 (Antonio Cassese ed. 1979); Oeter, supra

note 71, at 316.
82. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; see BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 510 (noting that
jus cogen norms are "'inalienable' or 'inherent"').
83. See Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 I.C.J. 90 29 (June 30);
PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, at 578.
84. PRINCIPLES, supra note 26.

85. Oeter, supra note 71, at 316.
86. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, G.A. Res 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514(XV) (Dec. 14, 1960)
("All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."); The United Nations and Decolonization: Trust Territories That
Have

Achieved

Self-Determination,

UNITED

NATIONS,

http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/selfdet.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2013)
(listing several Trust Territories, which are former colonies, that have achieved
statehood through self-determination).
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Denying Palestine the right to invoke self-determination may,
therefore, constitute a violation of ajus cogens norm.
III. PALESTINE'S STANDING TO BRING A CONTENTIOUS
CASE BEFORE THE ICJ

If the international community recognizes Palestine as a State
under international law, it could become, and then bring a case as, a
UN Member State. 8 7 While UN membership is a possible avenue for
Palestine to become a member to the ICJ Statute, the chances of
Palestine receiving UN membership at this time are slim. 8 Thus, this
route to ICJ litigation will not be discussed as thoroughly as the other
avenues through which Palestine can litigate in the ICJ.
As a non-UN Member State, Palestine has three avenues to get a
case before the ICJ. First, Palestine could join the ICJ Statute without
becoming a UN Member State.89 Second, Palestine could bring a
proceeding before the ICJ pursuant to Article 35(2) of the ICJ
Statute. 90 Third, a treaty may have a provision that gives the ICJ
87. UN Charter art. 93(1) (stating that "[a]ll members of the United Nations
are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice."); Id. art.
4(1); ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 34(1).
88.

1 Konrad Ginther, Article 4, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A

COMMENTARY 178 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2ed. 2002) (stating that to be a
Member State to the UN, "five conditions must be fulfilled... : the applicant must
be a (a) State and (b) peace-loving; it must (c) accept the obligations contained in
the Charter and (d) be able to carry out those obligations; and finally (e) it must be
willing to do so"); see UN Charter art. 4, para. 2 ("Membership in the United
Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able
and willing to carry out these obligations."). Arguably, the violence based out of
Palestine will preclude them from being deemed "peace loving." See Zanotti, supra
note 38, at 11-13. Further, UN Charter Article 4(2) requires applicants to receive a
recommendation by the Security Council, followed by a General Assembly vote, to
gain membership. UN Charter art. 4(2). Palestine likely will be vetoed in any SC
recommendation for statehood by the United States, which has a pro-Israel bias.
Zanotti, supra note 38, at 4; US Confirms It Will Veto PalestinianStatehood Bid,
THE

JERUSALEM

POST,

Sept.

8,

2011,

http://www.jpost.com/

DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=237199. The specific procedures and
likelihood of Palestine receiving UN membership is beyond the scope of this paper.
89. UN Charter art 93, para. 2 (allowing a state that is not a UN member to
become a party to the ICJ statute under certain conditions).
90. See ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 35, para. 2.
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jurisdiction to settle disputes between State Parties to the treaty.91
Regardless of the option it chooses, Palestine must also establish the
requisite mutual consent for ICJ jurisdiction for any contentious case.
A. Bringing a Contentious Case as a Non-UN Member State
1. Palestine'sability to join the ICJStatute
A non-member UN State may become a party to the ICJ Statute,
on conditions to be determined in each case by the GA, upon the
recommendation of the SC. 9 2 Five non-UN Members have joined the
ICJ Statute since 1946. 9 The conditions in each case were identical:
(1) acceptance of the provisions of the ICJ Statute; (2) acceptance of
all the obligations of a UN member under Article 94 of the UN
Charter; and (3) undertaking to contribute to the expenses of the ICJ
as the GA sees fit. 94 Currently, every State that is party to the ICJ
Statute is also a UN Member. 95 Each of the five non-UN Members
that joined after 1946 eventually became Members of the UN. 96 The
fact that all States that are members to the ICJ Statute are also all
presently UN members should not lead one to consider UN Charter
Article 93(2) as meaningless. 97 Joining the ICJ Statute would still
serve a purpose to Palestine, even if UN membership is unattainable. 98
91. While this avenue can provide access to the ICJ, the dispute must come
within the specific subject of the treaty. See ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36, para.
1.
92. UN Charter art. 93, para 2. This is reflected in Article 35(1) of the ICJ
Statute. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 34, para. 1 ("The Court shall be open to the
states parties to the present statute.").
93. Karin Oellers-Frahm, Article 93, in THE STATUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 179, 183 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2012) [hereinafter ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 93 UN CHARTER] (those countries,

none of which were UN members at the time, are Japan on April 2, 1954,
Liechtenstein on March 29, 1950, San Marino on February 18, 1954, Nauru on
January 29, 1988, and Switzerland on December 11, 1946).
94. Id.; see UN Charter art. 93, para. 2; ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 35, para.
3.
95.

ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 93; UN CHARTER, supra note 100, at 185.

96. See id.
97. Id.
98. See id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol44/iss1/4

18

Whitman: Palestine's Statehood and Ability to Litigate in the Internationa

2013]

PALESTINE'S STATEHOOD AND ABILITY To LITIGATE IN ICJ

91

If Palestine were denied UN membership, joining the ICJ Statute
would still allow Palestine to litigate in the ICJ. 99
a. How UN CharterArticle 93 andICJ Statute Article 35 would
allow Palestineto bring a case before the ICJ
Under UN Charter Article 93 and ICJ Statute Article 35(1),
Palestine could join the Statute of the ICJ without being a member to
the UN. 100 A potential obstacle might be Palestine's inability to pay
for the expenses of an ICJ proceeding. Further, access to the ICJ via
this option is contingent on Palestine being a State.' 0 ' The pertinent
phrase of UN Charter Article 93(2) is, "upon recommendation of the
Security Council."1 02
Palestine will struggle with two difficult hurdles if it tried to join
the ICJ Statute: (1) its status as a non-State,103 and (2) its ability to

99. See id; ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 35. Ideally, Palestine would like to
join the UN to enjoy other UN privileges besides the possibility of litigating in the
ICJ, such as membership in the GA. See UN Charter 4 art. 9, para. 1 (entitling UN
Member States are entitled to participation in the GA); see also Siegfried Magiera,
Article 9, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 445, 447

(Bruno Simma, et al. eds., 3ed. 2012) (noting that any new member may participate
in the GA upon admission). However, this paper is focused on the right to litigate in
the ICJ, and thus the other privileges rooted in UN membership will not be
discussed further.
100. UN Charter Article 93 and ICJ Statute Article 35(1) work together
allowing States that are not parties to the UN to become a State party to the ICJ
Statute. Andreas Zimmerman, Article 35, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 606, 620-21 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds.,

2ed. 2012) [hereinafter ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 35]; see UN Charter art. 93, para. 2;
ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 35.
101. See ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 34, para. 1.
102. UN Charter art. 93, para. 2. In the past, the main debate in the SC was
whether the applicant to the Statute was a State, not whether the applicant could
fulfill the conditions of complying with ICJ judgments. 2 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 1920-2005, 599 (2006)

[hereinafter LAW AND PRACTICE]. For example, Liechtenstein's application to join
the ICJ Statute, "although ultimately approved, was principally opposed on the
ground that Liechtenstein did not conduct its own foreign relations." Id. The Soviet
Union (USSR) "opposed Japan's application [to the ICJ] because at the time [the
USSR] did not maintain diplomatic relations with [Japan]." Id.
103. See supra Part II.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013

19

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2013], Art. 4

92

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

comply in good faith with ICJ judgments.1 04 Questions would arise as
to whether Palestine could, or would, comply with an ICJ judgment in
good-faith, due to its inability to exert complete authority over the
Palestinian territory.10 5 Failure to comply in good faith with an ICJ
judgment, however, would be self-defeating for Palestine because
Palestine would lose international accountability, which is the exact
goal that it is striving for. An additional concern is whether Palestine
could pay for the proceedings.1 06 There is little merit to this concern,
however, given that Palestine's current GDP exceeds that of several
UN Member States who can litigate in the ICJ. o7
b. The SC's Authority to Reject Palestine'sApplication to the ICJ
Statute
Under UN Charter Article 27(2), "[d]ecisions of the Security
Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of

104. UN Charter art. 94, para. 2.
105. UN Charter Article 94 requires States to comply in good faith with ICJ
judgments. UN Charter art. 94, para. 2. An issue may arise with Palestine's
compliance if they received an unfavorable judgment because of the difficulty of
enforcing ICJ judgments. See UN Charter art. 94; Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31) (providing an example of the US
not enforcing the ICJ's decision). The lack of government control would also affect
Palestine's statehood status. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 23, art. 1(c);
BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 71.
106. In 2011 the "West Bank's" GDP was $8.02 billion (USD). The World
Factbook: Middle East: West Bank: Economy, The Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA),
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/we.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). The Gaza strip's GDP is
calculated as part of the West Bank's. See The World Factbook: Middle East: Gaza
Strip: Economy, CIA, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/gz.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) ("see entry for West
Bank.").
107. The CIA Factbook lists the West Bank's GDP as 156 out of 229 entities
in the world, ahead of UN member states such as Liechtenstein and Monaco. The
World Factbook: Country Comparison: GDP: PurchasingPower Parity, CIA,
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/200 1rank.html?countryName=West%20Bank&countryCode=we
&regionCode=mde&rank-155#we (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
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nine members."' 08 The issue of whether admission to the ICJ Statute
is a procedural matter is a complex question.109 If admission is a
procedural matter, then an affirmative vote by nine member majority
of the SC would allow Palestine to become a member of the ICJ
Statute. 0 However, if admission is not a proceduralmatter, then all
permanent members of the SC must give concurring affirmative
votes. 111

This distinction is crucial because the United States is a
Permanent Member of the SC, and its vote is required if admission to
the ICJ Statute is a non-proceduralmatter.112 But if admission is a
procedural matter, then a concurring United States vote is not
required. 113 A major problem for Palestine arises when the United
States views Palestine's admission to the ICJ Statute as a nonproceduralmatter, while a majority of the SC viewed admission as a
proceduralmatter.114 The issue becomes even more complex where,
108. UN Charter art. 27, para. 2. The UN SC has fifteen members. United
Nations
Security
Counsel,
Current Members,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
109. Although there is no uniformly accepted definition of procedural matter,
UN Charter Article 18(2) provides some clarity. 1 Stefan Brunner & Bruno Simma,
Article 27, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 485 (Bruno

Simma et al. eds., 2ed. 2002). It provides that important questions for the GA
include: issues of international peace and security, admission of new members, and
suspension of rights and privileges of members. UN Charter art. 18, para. 2. This
list is not exhaustive, however. Andreas Zimmermann, Article 27, in THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 871, 890 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d
ed. 2012) [hereinafter ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 27 UN CHARTER]. If important
questions for the GA amount to more than "procedural matters," for the SC, then an
affirmative nine votes, without any vetoes by the permanent members of the SC,
would suffice for Palestine to join the ICJ Statute. 1 Rildiger Wolfrum, Article 18,
in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 621, 625 (Bruno

Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012).
110. See 1 Andreas Zimmermann, Article 27, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 871, 890 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012)
[hereinafter ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 27 UN CHARTER].
111. UN Charter art. 27, para. 2; ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 27 UN CHARTER,
supra note 110.
112. See UN Charter art. 27, para. 2; CurrentMembers, supra note 108.
113. See UN Charter art. 27, para. 2.
114. See 1 Bruna Simma et. al., Article 27, in The Charter of the United
Nations: A Commentary 491 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (noting that a
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against the will of a permanent member, a simple majority of the SC
regards a matter as procedural. This would make Palestine's bid to
join the ICJ Statute unlikely, as the United States would essentially
wield veto power over Palestine's efforts."'
Furthermore, when the GA and SC allow an entity to join the ICJ
under Article 93(2) of the UN Charter, they implicitly accept an entity
as a State for the purposes of ICJ Statute Article 35(1). 16 Therefore,
if these principal organs of the UNl 7 decide that an entity is a State,
that decision is binding on the ICJ, who could not dismiss a case for
lack of jurisdiction." 8 Thus, pursuant to UN Charter Article 93, and
upon a recommendation by the SC, Palestine could access the ICJ by
becoming a Member of the ICJ Statute without becoming a Member
State to the UN.11 9 Such an action would likely solidify Palestine's
standing as a State.
conflict such as this could be settled by an impartial third-party, and could be
referred to the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion.).
115. See THE JERUSALEM POST, supra note 88.
116. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 35, supra note 100, at 617; see UN Charter art.

93, para. 2; ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art 35, para. 1 ("The Court shall be open to all
states parties to the present statute."); LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 102, at 616-

17. If Palestine joined the ICJ Statute, the SC and the GA implicitly would consider
Palestine as a State, and Palestine's bid for UN membership would thus be
strengthened. See ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 34, para. 1 (explaining that only
States may come before the ICJ).
117. The GA and the SC are the most powerful organs in the UN. See UN
Charter art. 7, para. 1; Andreas Paulus & Matthias Lippold, Article 7, in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 387, 391 (Bruno Simma, et al.

eds., 3d ed. 2012).
118.

ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 35, supra note 100, at 617; see LAW AND

PRACTICE, supra note 102, at 616-17; see, e.g., Application of Convention on
Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. &
Montenegro.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 605 (July 11) (dismissing a case for lack of
jurisdiction). Furthermore, the ICJ could not rule that Palestine is not a State because
only states can appear before the ICJ. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art 34, para. 1. This
is a different scenario than allowing the ICJ to determine whether Palestine is a State
under ICJ Statute Article 35(2). See id. art 35, para. 2.
119. This assumes that the GA voting patterns would be consistent with the
UNESECO and Non-Member Observer State voting results. See G.A. Res. 67/19,
supra note 60; General Conference Admits Palestine as UNESCO Member,
UNESCOPRESS
(Oct.
31,
2011),
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/mediaservices/single-view/news/general conference-admits.palestine-as unesco_
member-state/.
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2. The Implications ofICJ Statute Article 35(2) on Palestine
If Palestine is unable to join the UN or the ICJ Statute outright, it
could still bring a contentious case before the ICJ under ICJ Statute
Article 35(2),120 which allows the SC to lay down special treaty
provisions that prescribe conditions under which the ICJ shall be open
to other states.'21 Under S.C. Res. 9 (1946), the ICJ is open to nonmember States of the UN or the ICJ Statute, which have previously
deposited a declaration with the Registrar of the Court, and accepted
jurisdiction of the ICJ, and obligations according to UN Charter Art.
94. 122 If Palestine were to bring a case under ICJ Statute Art. 35(2),
the issue of statehood may be less problematic than if Palestine were
to try to join the ICJ Statute under UN Charter Art. 93. 123
a. The Unique JurisdictionalProblems Under Art. 35 (2)
ICJ Statute Article 35(2) presents the easiest path for Palestine to
get before the ICJ. However, the jurisdictional conditions built into
120. See ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 35, para. 2. The ICJ is open to States
that are neither a party to the ICJ Statute, nor UN members. Hermann Mosler &
Karin OellersFrahm, Article 93, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A

COMMENTARY 1171, 1173 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter UN
COMMENTARY ART. 93 2ED].
121. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 35, para. 2 ("The conditions under which
the Court shall be open to other states shall, subject to the special provisions
contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security Council . ...") (emphasis

added). Acting under the powers granted via ICJ Statute Article 35(2), the SC
outlined conditions to access the ICJ by adopting S.C. Res. 9. ICJ COMMENTARY
ART. 35, supra note 100, at 621; see S.C Res. 9, supra note 18.
122. S.C. Res. 9, supra note 18, 1.
123. In contrast to UN Charter Article 93, the GA and SC have never made a
prior determination on statehood when an entity brings a case under ICJ Statute
Article 35(2). See LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 102, at 616-17 (distinguishing an
ICJ Statute Art. 35(2) determination of statehood from a State joining the ICJ Statute
outright where the GA and SC already determined that it is a State). Here, the ICJ
could decide whether Palestine is a State under ICJ Statute article 35. Thus, even if
the SC believed that Palestine did not qualify as a State in the international system,
the ICJ would have the discretion to decide whether or not Palestine qualified as a
State, pursuant to paragraph 5 of S.C. Res. 9 and Article 41 of the ICJ Rules of
Court. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 35, supra note 100, at 617; see S.C. Res. 9, supra

note 18; Rules of Court 978, I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 6 art. 41; LAW & PRACTICE,
supra note 102, at 616-17.
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ICJ Article 35(2) vis-a-vis S.C. Res. 9 (1946), may nevertheless
present insurmountable hurdles for Palestine to clear. Under ICJ
Statute Article 36(2), parties to the ICJ Statute may recognize the
court's jurisdiction in relation to another party as compulsory.1 24 S.C.
Res. 9 (1946) allows States pursuing ICJ access to make a similar
declaration, with a caveat. 125 It provides that such acceptance may
not, without explicit consent, be relied upon vis-it-vis UN member
States, which have made a compulsory jurisdiction declaration under
ICJ Statute 36(2). 126 Therefore, unlike States parties to the ICJ, who
make declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction under ICJ Statute
Article 36(2), if Palestine brought a case under ICJ Article 35(2),
those States accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ could
decline to accept Palestine's declaration. 127
Because Palestine is not a party to the ICJ Statute, it may not
know in advance, whether the ICJ would have jurisdiction over a
dispute between it and another State brought under Article 35(2) in
conjunction with S.C. Res. 9 (1946). 128 An opposing State that
Palestine brings a claim against in this manner could reject ICJ
jurisdiction, leaving Palestine with no recourse in the ICJ.
b. Whether a Treaty Can Provide an Avenue to the ICJvia
Art. 35(2)
Article 35(2) subjects the SC's power to determine conditions to
admit third party states "to the special provisions contained in treaties
in force . ... ."129 The principle underlying ICJ Article 35(2) is that
124. ICJ Statue, supra note 9, art. 36, para. 2.
125. S.C. Res. 9, supra note 18, 2.
126. Id.
127.

See ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 35, supra note 100, at 623-24. Israel

terminated its compulsory jurisdiction declaration in 1985. See Declaration
Recognizing as Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in
Conformity with Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, Oct. 3, 1956, 252 U.N.T.S. 301 (recognizing compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ over Israel); Amendment to the Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory the
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice Under Article 36, Paragraph 2, of
the Statute of the Court, Feb. 28, 1984, 1349 U.N.T.S. 326 (terminating Israel's
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice).
128.

ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 35, supra note 100, at 624.

129.

ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 35, para. 2.
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pre-existing jurisdictional bases, via a treaty provision, should not be
overridden by a SC resolution.130 The ICJ has held that ICJ Article
35(2) does not cover Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention,
which provides compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ because ICJ Article
35(2) relates only to treaties concluded prior to the Statute of the
ICJ.131 Accordingly, only treaties entered into force before October
24, 1945 "may be considered as 'treaties in force' within the meaning
of Art. 35(2)."32

For purposes of Article 35(2), only treaties entered into force
before the creation of the ICJ Statute enable a State that is neither a
UN Member, nor a party to the ICJ Statute, access to the ICJ without
making a declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction pursuant to
S.C. Res. 9 (1946). 133 Consequently, Palestine cannot circumvent the
discretion of the SC, found in S.C. Res. 9 (1946), by exclusively
relying on treaty provisions that provide for ICJ jurisdiction over a
dispute. 134
B. JurisdictionalObstacles in the ICJ
Once in front of the ICJ, procedural barriers, like jurisdiction, may
act to prevent the merits of Palestine's case from being heard.135
Finding a party that will consent to ICJ jurisdiction is Palestine's
largest obstacle in adjudicating in the ICJ. Under all the scenarios
discussed, the ICJ has jurisdiction over the other party to hear the
merits of the case.' 36 ICJ Article 36 gives the ICJ authority to

130.

ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 35, supra note 100, at 625.

131. Legality of Use of Force, (Serb. & Montenegro v. Beig. and Nine Other
States), 2004 I.C.J. 279,
113-14 (Dec. 15); see Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. IX, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
[hereinafter Genocide Convention].
132.

133.
134.
Palestine
relations
1922,

ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 35, supra note 100, at 628.

Id. at 628, 630.
Palestine was a party to several treaties before 1945, however, under
Mandate article 12: "Britain was responsible for Palestine's foreign
and treaty making authority." The Palestine Mandate art. 12, July 24,

22

L.N.T.S.

354;

JOHN QUIGLEY,

THE STATEHOOD

OF PALESTINE:

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 53 (2010).

135. See ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36.
136. See id. arts. 35-36.
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adjudicate disputes between states, 13 7 which reinforces the importance
of statehood because the ICJ may not legitimately adjudicate disputes
with or among any non-state subjects of international law.1 38
Additionally, Article 36 of the ICJ Statute encourages mutual
consent,139 which means that States cannot be compelled to accept ICJ
jurisdiction.140 Further, the UN Charter expressly states that parties to
any dispute have the right to choose the form of settlement. 14 1 Thus,
Palestine must obtain the consent of the opposing State before
proceedings are initiated in the ICJ.142
ICJ Article 36 provides three methods for the ICJ to gain
jurisdiction over states.
First, via what is known as Ad Hoc
43
jurisdiction,1 the ICJ can enter into a special agreement with another
State.144 Second, the ICJ can be a party to a compromissory clause
contained in a treaty.145 Third, under ICJ Article 36(2), a State can
submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ via a unilateral
declaration.146 These latter two methods of ICJ gaining jurisdiction
are referred to as the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction.147 Each option
137. See ICJ

Statute, supra note 9, art. 36, paras. 1-2; Christian Tomuschat,

Article 36, in THE STATUE

OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A

COMMENTARY 633, 641 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter
ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36].
138. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note 137, at 641.

139. Id. at 647. The principle of mutual consent derives from UN Charter Art.
33(1). UN Charter art. 33, para. 1; ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note 1137, at

647.
140. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note 137, at 647. If ICJ jurisdiction
could be forced on States, the record of judgments actually complied with would be
atrocious. Id. at 648.
141. UN Charter art. 33, para. 1.
142. However, the ICJ may have jurisdiction without a State's consent if that
State has made a compulsory jurisdiction declaration under ICJ Statute 36(2). ICJ
Statute, supra note, 9, art. 36, para. 2.
143. Ad hoc jurisdiction is essentially arbitration, where both parties consent to
jurisdiction. MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (6th ed. 2012).
144. Id. art. 36, para. 1.
145. See ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36, para. 1; ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36,

supra note 137, at 665; see also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
(Qatar v. Bahrain), 1995 I.C.J. 6, 1 31 (Feb. 15) (allowing Bahrain and Qatar to
litigate in the ICJ because of a compromisory clause in a treaty).
146. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36, para. 2; see JANIS, supra note 138.
147.

Id. para. 2; PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, at 726.
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involves an element of State consent, which can come at different
stages of a dispute. 14 8 Palestine would need to satisfy one of these
three prongs in order for the ICJ to hear the merits of its case.
1. Ad hoc jurisdictionofICJ Statute Article 36(1) in relation to
Palestine
ICJ Article 36(1) provides, "the jurisdiction of the Court
comprises all cases which the parties refer to it."' 49 If the Parties
choose this option, they enter into a special agreement, referred to as a
compromis.150 The compromis defines the issues the ICJ is to resolve,
and gives the ICJ jurisdiction over the dispute,' 5 ' allowing the ICJ to
"operate much like a public international arbitration tribunal." 52
When using this option, the States consent to ICJ jurisdiction after the
dispute arises. 153 While many of the Court's effective decisions have
occurred in compromis cases, they rarely involve highly charged or
politically important subject matter. 154
If Palestine gains access to the ICJ through statehood,'15 it could
stipulate with another State to ICJ jurisdiction. But, given the
politically charged nature of the disputes Palestine could potentially
bring,156 it is unlikely that a State, specifically Israel, would consent to
ICJ jurisdiction through a special agreement.
148. See MARK WESTON JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 325 (4th ed. 2011).

149. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36, para. 1. Thus, the parties to a "dispute
can jointly come to the conclusion that it would it would be wisest solution to seek
judicial settlement through the [ICJ]" via the language "all cases which the parties
refer to it." Id. (emphasis added); ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note 137, at
660.
150.

ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note 137, at 660.

151. Id.; JANIS, supra note 162, at 134.
152. JANIS, supra note 143, at 134.
153. See id.
154. JANIS, supra note 143, at 135.
155. See UN Charter art. 93; ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 35, para. 2; supra,
Part II.
156. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 163 (July 9) (listing a
series of violations of international law for which Israel is responsible, and which
Palestine would want to litigate in a contentious case setting).
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2. The Impact of CompulsoryjurisdictionofICJStatue Article 36
The ICJ could have compulsory jurisdiction over disputes
between States. Compulsory jurisdiction derives from language in ICJ
Statute Articles 36(1), and 36(2).'
ICJ compulsory jurisdiction
subjects parties to jurisdiction without their consent.'1 8
a. Treaties and compulsoryjurisdictionofICJ Statute
Article 36(1)
First, ICJ Article 36(1) gives the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction via
the text of the statute, "treaties or conventions in force."l 59 in
particular, these treaties must have provisions that provide for the ICJ
to settle any disputes that relate to the treaty.' 60 Therefore, Palestine
could access the ICJ if it became a State and a party to one of these
treaties, and had a dispute with a State also party to that treaty, and
that dispute concerned the substantive terms of the treaty.16 1
Approximately 300 bilateral or multilateral treaties contain such
provisions.1 62 For example, if Palestine was to join the Genocide
Convention, Article 9 of the Genocide Convention provides that
"[d]isputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention ...
shall be submitted to the [ICJ] at the request of any of the parties to

157. Legal Implications, supra note 58, n.7; see ICJ Statute, supra note 6, art.
36, paras. 1-2.
158. JANIS, supra note 162, at 137-38.
159. Legal Implications, supra note 57, n.7; see ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art.
36, para. 1; ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note 137, at 656-57.
160. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36, para. 1; see U.N. G.A. Rep. of the Int'l
Court of Justice, Aug. 1, 2009-July 31, 2010, T 8, U.N. Doe. A/65/4; GAOR, 65th
Sess., Supp. No. 4 (2010) [hereinafter 2009-20 10 ICJ Report].
161. See ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note 137, at 670; see also Oil
Platforms, Preliminary Objection, (Iran v. U.S.) 1996 I.C.J. 803 M 34-43 (Dec. 12)
(providing an example of the ICJ interpreting the substantive treaty provisions of the
1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United
States and Iran).
162. 2009-2010 ICJ Report, supra note 160, 55; JANIS, supra note 162, at
140.
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the dispute." 16 3 Palestine could become a party to the Genocide
Convention if it received an invitation from the GA.164
The dispute, however, must involve the application of that treaty's
terms. 165 Even if Palestine joined the Genocide Convention and was
either a UN Member, a party to the ICJ Statute, or fulfilled the
conditions of S.C. Res. 9 (1946), any dispute that Palestine brings via
Article 9 would have to be about something specifically contained in
the Genocide Convention.1 6 6 The ICJ has made it clear that disputes
appearing before the court via a compromissory clause in a treaty
must be about the specific application of that treaty and nothing else,
unless it is stipulated to.167 Palestine would need to allege that an act
of Genocide occurred in its territory, or another State party's territory,
for Palestine to successfully bring a claim under the Genocide
Convention.1 68
163. Genocide Convention, supra note 131, art. 9. This is possible, as
Switzerland became a State party to the Genocide Convention nearly six years
before becoming a member of the UN. Accession to Convention on the Prevention
of the Crime of Genocide, Sept. 6, 2000, 2121 U.N.T.S. 282, available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202121/v2121.pdf (providing
that Switzerland's accession to the Genocide Convention was effective on December
6, 2000); Press Release, United Nations, United Nations Member States, U.N. Press
available
at
(July
3,
2006),
Release
ORG/1469
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/orgl469.doc.htm (listing Switzerland's
date of joining the UN as Sept. 10, 2002) (noting that Switzerland acceded to the
Genocide Convention on 7 Sept. 2000).
164. Genocide Convention, supra note 131, art. XI. If Palestine shows an
interest in joining the Genocide Convention, and member states of the GA continue
their pro-Palestine voting pattern, Palestine could plausibly become a party to the
Genocide Convention as a "non-member State." Legal Implications, supra note 57,
n.7.
165.

ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note 137, at 670 ("The compromisory

clauses contained in bilateral or multilateral treaties must always be seen in
connection with the substantive portions of the treaty concerned . . . .").
166. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art 36, para. 1,; see ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36,

supra note 137, at 670 .
167. See Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. 124,
40-41 (June 2); ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note 137, at 669-70.

40-41. The ICJ held that
168. See Legality of Use of Force, 1999 I.C.J. at
under the Genocide Convention, Genocide is the killing of a group, and the mere
threat or use of force against a State is not genocide under the convention. Id. at
39-40. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note 137, at 669. As a result, the court

found that there was no jurisdiction to litigate this case under Art. 9 of the Genocide

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013

29

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2013], Art. 4

102

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

The Genocide Convention is one of many treaties that Palestine
could join, which contains compromissory clauses. Regardless of
which treaty Palestine joins, the procedure Palestine would have to go
through for the ICJ to have jurisdiction via a compromissory clause is
Additionally, many States attach reservations to
the same.
compromissory clauses to limit the ability of a State to compel the
State making the treaty reservation to appear before the ICJ.169 This
procedure does not allow the compromissory clause to apply to the
State that attaches a reservation, and consequentially eliminates
compulsory jurisdiction.17 0
Moreover, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties allows
specialized agencies of the UN, such as UNESCO, to become parties
to treaties.' 71 Thus, if UNESCO becomes a party to a treaty with an
ICJ compromissory clause, and brings a claim, the ICJ could have
jurisdiction over that claim.1 72 Theoretically, as a Member State to
UNESCO, Palestine could bring a dispute to the ICJ that arises out of
the treaty's terms. But the dispute would have to involve the terms of
the treaty and UNESCO would have to be a party to the treaty. 173
convention, as there was no genocide by Yugoslavia under the treaty, and thus the
matters at issue were not specifically provided for by the Genocide Convention.
Legality of Use of Force case 1999 I.C.J. at T 40-41.
169. Legal Implications supra note 57, n.7; see, e.g., VCLT, supra note 82,
art. 19. For a list of States that have made treaty reservations to Article 36(2) of the
ICJ Statute, see DeclarationsRecognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the
InternationalCourt of Justice Under Article 36, Paragraph2, of the Statute of the
Court, UN

TREATY

COLLECTION http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx

?src=TREATY& mtdsgno=I-4&chapter-I&1ang-en (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
170. See, e.g., VCLT, supra note 82, arts. 19-23.
171. VCLT, supra note 82, art. 81; U.N. LEGAL COUNSEL, FINAL CLAUSES OF
MULTILATERAL TREATIES HANDBOOK, at 15, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.3 (2008)

[hereinafter UN Treaties Handbook] (describing the Vienna Formula, which allows
international agencies and organizations to join treaties, in addition to states).
172. See UN Treaties Handbook, supra note 171; see, e.g., United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 20. May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107; see also Agreement For Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and
Auditory Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character art. XV,
July 15, 1949, 197 U.N.T.S. 3 (providing that the treaty is open for signature to
specialized agencies such as UNESCO); id. art. IX (containing the treaty's
compromisory clause).
173. To see a list a UNESCO related treaties and conventions visit:
Conventions Legal Instruments, UNESCO, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
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Only then could Palestine, via UNESCO, bring a claim against other
States that are party to the treaty.' 74
b. The Effect of ICJStatute Article 36(2) Compulsory
JurisdictionDeclarationon Palestine
The ICJ also has compulsory jurisdiction over States through the
ICJ Statute, Article 36(2), which is an optional, compulsory
jurisdiction provision.' 7 5 If two States make 36(2) declarations, then
if either State wants to bring an action against the other in the ICJ, the
responding State is compelled to accept ICJ jurisdiction. This is
contrasted to ICJ Article 36(1) where consent from each State party is
required.17 6 The notion of ICJ compulsory jurisdiction is analogous to
the American court system where parties are generally compelled to
come before the court regardless if the party consents to an action or

not.177 Thus, if Palestine became a Member to the UN or the ICJ
Statute, it could issue a compulsory jurisdiction declaration.' 78 But all
parties to a dispute must accept the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction in

order to bring a case under Article 36(2).

179

The effect of Article

36(2) is similar to that of a compromissory clause.

80

The difference

URLID=12025&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=-471.html
Oct. 25, 2013).

(last visited

174. This theory is contingent on Palestine being a State because only States
can appear before the ICJ, and UNESCO, which is not a State, cannot bring a claim
before the ICJ. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 34, para. 1; see JANIS, supra note 143,
at 139.
175. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36, para. 2 ("The states parties to the
present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to other States accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court . . . .") (emphasis added).
176. See ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36, para. 1.
177.

WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, ET AL., PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL

3:11 (Nat. ed 2013) ("'Personal jurisdiction' refers to
the court's power to render a judgment that either commands defendant's personal
obedience or imposes obligations on the defendant that will be enforced by other
courts.") (citing Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 609-10 (1990)).
178. See UN Charter art. 93, paras. 1, 2; ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36,
para. 2.
179. JANIS, supra note 143, at 139.
180. PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, at 726-27; see VCLT, supra note 82, art. 66
(providing a compromisory clause that allows parties to submit disputes to the ICJ);
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013

31

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2013], Art. 4

104 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
is the subject matter of the compulsory jurisdiction contained in
Under Article 36(2) the ICJ has compulsory
Article 36(2).
jurisdiction over:
[A]ll legal disputes concerning: a) the interpretation of a treaty; b)
any question of international law; c) the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation; [and] d)the nature or extent of the reparation to be made
for the breach of the international obligation.' 8 1
The scope of Article 36(2) compulsory jurisdiction can thus be
seen as much broader compared with a compromissory clause
contained in a single treaty. This could benefit Palestine because it
allows any subject matter relating to any dispute of international law
to be adjudicated in the ICJ, rather than only the subject matter of a
single treaty. Currently, the compulsory effect of ICJ Article 36(2) is
ineffective because of the numerous reservations the majority of
States attach to 36(2) declarations.' 82 Thus, compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ over a case involving Palestine is highly unlikely, unless the
case fits nicely into another State's 36(2) specifically tailored
The number of
declaration and accompanying reservation.
reluctance to be
States'
reservations to ICJ Article 36(2) demonstrates
exposed to liability in the ICJ.
Genocide Convention, supra note 131, art. IX (providing a compromisory clause
that allows parties to submit a dispute to the ICJ regarding the interpretation or
application of the Genocide Convention).
181. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36, para. 2.
182. To date, there are sixty-seven States that have made ICJ Article 36(2)
declarations, but most declarations carry with them a reservation. ICJ COMMENTARY
ART. 36, supra note 137, at 676-77. These reservations usually limit the applicability
of Article 36(2) to non-domestic disputes, and certain territorial disputes. JANIS,
supra note 143, at 139.; see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
1, 45-46, 172-75, 179 (June 27)
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 392,
(providing an example of the United States withdrawing their compulsory
jurisdiction under ICJ Statute article 36(2)); ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 36, supra note
137, at 679 (describing the Nicaragua case in further detail); see also Declarations
Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the InternationalCourt of Justice
under Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, UNITED NATIONS
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
COLLECTION,
TREATY
TREATY&mtdsg-no=I-4&chapter- 1&lang-en (providing an example of every
State that has made a reservation to ICJ Statute article 36(2) declarations) (last
visited Nov. 9, 2013).
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c. The Nexus Between S.C. Res. 9 (1946) and ICJStatute
Article 36(2)
As discussed in section III.A.2, Palestine can access the ICJ by
complying with ICJ Statute, Article 35(2), and S.C. Res. 9 (1946).183
Given that Palestine is neither a current member of the UN, nor a
party to the ICJ Statute, this is Palestine's best option to gain access
the ICJ.
One of the benefits of an Article 36(2) declaration is that it does
not require another State that has also made an Article 36(2)
declaration to consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction. 18 4 S.C. Res. 9 (1946)
allows States that are pursuing access to the ICJ via S.C. Res. 9 (1946)
such as Palestine to make the equivalent of an Article 36(2)
declaration. 85 Such a declaration, however, is not effective against a
State that has made an Article 36(2) declaration and is also a party to
the ICJ Statute. 186 By making a declaration, a State has already
consented to compulsory jurisdiction and is required to appear before
the ICJ. However, if Palestine, made such a declaration under S.C.
Res. 9 (1946), it would not reap the same benefit as an ICJ Statute
Member State that makes a declaration under Article 36(2) because it
is not a party to the ICJ Statute, and thus the Member State is not
compelled to accept jurisdiction.' 8 7 Therefore, according to S.C. Res.
183. See supra part Part III.A.2.
184. See ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 36, para. 2.
185. S.C. Res. 9, supra note 18, para. 2 ("A State ... may, in accordance with
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, recognize as compulsory, ipso facto and
without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court. . . .").
186. A State can make a general declaration in accordance with ICJ Article
36(2), "however, ... such acceptance may not, without explicit agreement, be relied
upon vis-A-vis States parties to the [ICJ] Statute which have made the declaration in
conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, who are parties to the ICJ Statute." Id.
187. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the InternationalCourt of
Justice, UNITED

NATIONS

TREATY

COLLECTION,

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/

ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=I-3&chapter-1 &lang-en (last visited
Nov. 6, 2013) (noting the discrepancy between compulsory jurisdiction under S.C.
Res. 9, and traditional compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2) of the ICJ statute).
Interestingly, if Palestine made such a declaration, other States would not need
Palestine's consent in order for the ICJ to have jurisdiction. See S.C. Res. 9, supra
note 18, 1 2. The language in S.C. Res. 9 creates a one-way street of acceptance,
favoring those States who are already UN members, and or parties to the ICJ Statute.
Id.
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9 (1946), any State that has made an ICJ Article 36(2) declaration
must consent to appear before a proceeding involving Palestine, even
though that State has already made an Article 36(2) declaration.' 8 8

IV.

THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS INVOLVING AN

ICJ ADVISORY OPINION

Palestine's ability to bring a contentious case before the ICJ seems

bleak. But the ICJ may still offer Palestine some recourse because of
its ability to issue advisory opinions. 189 UN Charter Article 96(a)
allows the ICJ to "give an advisory opinion on any legal question" if
the GA or SC requests one. 190
A. The ProceduralAspects of an Advisory Opinion
The procedural aspects regarding Palestine's chances of receiving
an advisory opinion from the ICJ are important. The ICJ has held that
the GA can request an advisory opinion concerning international
peace and security when the SC has failed to address the matter. 191
Given Palestine's status as a Non-Member State observer, and the
broader international issues concerning Palestine, the GA can be a
competent organ to ask for an advisory opinion.
1. The competence of UNESCO requesting an advisory opinion
The ICJ can decline to issue an advisory opinion if the scope of
the requested advisory opinion does not relate to the activities of the
requesting UN specialized agency.192 Thus UNESCO (a specialized
188. See S.C. Res. 9, supra note 18, 2.
189. See UN Charter art. 96, para. 1; ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 65, para. 1.
190. UN Charter art. 96, para. 1. ICJ Statute, Article 65(1) allows the ICJ to
"give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may
be authorized or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such
a request." ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 65, para 1.
191. Jochen Frowein & Karin Oellers-Frahm, Article 65, in THE STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 1605, 1613 (Andreas

Zimmermann et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65]
(citing Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, paras. 18-23 (July 9)).
192. UN Charter art. 96, para. 2 ("[O]rgans of the United Nations and
specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General
Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal question arising
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UN agency) can request an advisory opinion concerning Palestine, if
the issue arises within the scope of UNESCO's activities. One can
glean the scope of UNESCO's activities from its Constitution:
The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and
security by promoting collaboration among the nations through
education, science and culture in order to further universal respect
for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and
fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the

world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the
Charter of the United Nations.' 93
Strictly construed, UNESCO's activities involve education,
science, and culture, 194 which are the means that UNESCO will use
to accomplish its goals. Presumably this would fall under the guise of
"activities" in Article 96 of the UN Charter, empowering the ICJ to
issue an advisory opinion. 195
Broadly construed, UNESCO's activities also involve the
"universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for. . . human
rights and fundamental freedoms ... ."19 6
Under the narrow
approach, it seems that Palestine is using their UNESCO membership
to advance claims of sovereignty over important historical and cultural
sites, such as the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem.1 97 Because the
within the scope of their activities.") (emphasis added). For example, the World
Health Organization (WHO) "repeatedly requested the ICJ to issue an advisory
opinion concerning the use of nuclear weapons," but the ICJ declined because the
request fell beyond the scope of WHO's activities. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65,
supra note 191, at 1617 (citing Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
14, 22 (July 8)). The ICJ reasoned
that the use of nuclear weapons fell outside the scope of the WHO activities, and
therefore the ICJ did not have the authority to issue an advisory opinion. Use of
Nuclear Weapons 1996 I.C.J. 22; see UN Charter art. 96, 2; ICJ Statute supra
note 9, art. 65, 1.
193. UNESCO Constitution, supra note 54, art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added).
194. Id.
195. See UN Charter art. 96, para. 2.
196. UNESCO Constitution, supra note 54, art. 1, para. 1.
197. Zanotti, supra note 38, at 10; see Church of the Nativity and the
PilgrimageRoute in Bethlehem, Palestine, Inscribed on UNESCO World Heritage
List Along with Sites from Israel, Palau,Indonesia, and Morocco, UNESCO (June
29,
2012),
[hereinafter
UNESCO
Names
Heritage
Site]
http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/896.
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Church of the Nativity is a cultural site for Palestine, a dispute
concerning the site may fall under UNESCO's activities, as required
by UN Charter Article 96(2). 198 Under the broader approach,
presumably, the issue of "self-determination" would fall under the
activities of either universal respect for justice, human rights, or
fundamental freedoms, in the UNESCO constitution.' 9 9 Thus, the ICJ
may determine that Palestine is able to receive an advisory opinion on
its statehood because statehood relates to self-determination, and the
right to self-determination is an activity of UNESCO.2 0 0
2. The benefit of non-consensualadvisory opinions
Unlike a contentious case, the ICJ does not need to receive the
consent of States in order to issue an advisory opinion. 201' This is
crucial regarding Palestine because it is unlikely that a State would
consent to ICJ jurisdiction in a contentious case. 202 Because an
advisory opinion does not have any binding force, no State can
prevent the ICJ from issuing one. 20 3 Consequently, the ICJ's opinion
is not given to the States, but rather to the UN organ, which requested
it.204 If the request came from the GA, implicitly a majority of
Member States gave their consent because States make up the GA. 205
Given the recent voting patterns of the GA involving Palestine, it is
198. See UN Charter art. 96, para. 2.
199. UNESCO Constitution, supra note 54, art. 1, 1.
200. However, given the ICJ's narrow holding in the WHO case, the issue in a
UNESCO request would likely have to apply to education, science, or culture. See
Legality of Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, 22 (July 8) (finding that questions surrounding the use of
nuclear weapons were beyond the activities of the WHO).
201. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65, supra note 191, at 1616-17.
202. See supra Part. III.B.
203. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65, supra note 191, at 1616.
204. Id. at 1621. However, in its advisory jurisprudence, the Court noted that a
lack of consent might be a factor regarding the judicial weight given to an advisory
opinion. Id. at 1617.
205. See UN Charter art. 4, para. 1; id. art. 9, para. 1; id. art. 10; id. art. 11,
para. 2; id. 18, para. 3; see also Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, at 7 (July 23) (providing an example of how states, here the
States comprising the League of Nations, approves of the subject matter in an
advisory opinion).
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likely that the GA would vote favorably concerning the issuance of an
advisory opinion involving Palestine.2 0 6
The word "may" in ICJ Article 65(1) of the ICJ Statute gives the
ICJ discretion to decline a request, 207 but the ICJ has noted that it
should only refuse to give an advisory opinion for compelling
reasons. 208 To date, however, the ICJ, using its discretionary authority
to issue an advisory opinion, has never declined to do so. 20 9 In fact,
the ICJ issued an advisory opinion regarding Palestine in The Wall
Opinion in 2004.210

B. The legal effect of an advisory opinion on Palestine
While an advisory opinion is not binding, ICJ opinions may still
have some legal effect, 211 due to the GA's practice of turning advisory
opinions into GA resolutions. 212 The resolutions have the effect of
206. However, the subject matter of the question posed by the GA for the ICJ,
may affect the voting patterns of the GA member states. Just because GA member
states voted in favor of Palestinian statehood does not necessarily mean that the GA
would approve of any question sent to the ICJ for an advisory opinion. Thus, the
subject matter of the request would probably impact whether the GA would approve
of such a request.
207. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 65, para. 1; ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65,
supra note 191, at 1617.
208. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, 416, T 30
(July 22); ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65, supra note 191, at 1617. Note this refusal is
discretionary, versus a non-discretionary refusal that does not meet the standards of
ICJ Article 65(1). ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65, supra note 191, at 1617. When the
ICJ refused to issue an advisory opinion regarding the WHO concerns over nuclear
weapons, this refusal was not a discretionary refusal; it was based on the scope of
the agency's activities. Id.; see Legality of Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in
22 (July 8) (refusing to
Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66,
nuclear weapons were
regarding
issues
address the concerns of the WHO because
activities).
the
WHO's
deemed outside
209. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65, supra note 191, at 1617.
210. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 163 (July 9) (holding
that the wall separating Palestinian from Israeli territory should be dismantled);
JANIS, supra note 143, at 153-54.
211.

See

3

SHABTAI

ROSENNE,

THE

LAW

AND

PRACTICE

OF THE

INTERNATIONAL COURT 1920-2005, 1698-1700 (2006) [hereinafter ROSENNE vol. 3].
212. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65, supra note 191, at 1621.
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creating soft law,213 interpreting the UN Charter, or demonstrating that
the legal principles referred to in the resolutions are evidence of
customary international law. 2 14 In fact, the GA adopted portions of
the Wall Opinion in a resolution. 215 The Wall Opinion may be a poor
example of the efficacy of an advisory opinion, as it had a minimal
remedial impact on the Middle East's complex politics. 2 16 But an
advisory opinion stating that the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem
is Palestinian sovereign territory may be influential regarding
Palestinian statehood and UN membership.2 17 One can only speculate
on the efficacy of another advisory opinion involving Palestine, which
will primarily be determined by the substance of the request. 2 18

213. Shaw, supra note 27, at 117-19 (noting that instruments or documents
that contain non-binding provisions are defined as soft law, which is still important
within the general framework of international legal development).
214. See BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 15; JANIS, supra note 143, at 154.
215. G.A. Res. ES-10/15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/15 (Aug. 2, 2004).
216. JANIS, supra note 143, at 153-54. However, the opinion held that all
states are under an obligation to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the
construction of a wall; and all parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War are also under an obligation to
ensure compliance of Israel. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, T 163 (July
9).
217. See UNESCO Names HeritageSite, supra note 197.
218. Advisory opinions are useful in developing international law, despite
their limited effect. See ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65, supra note 191, at 1628-29. In
practice, however, states have treated the authority of the Court's advisory opinions
in much the same fashion as they have accepted (or not) the Court's authority to
settle contentious cases.", JANIS, supra note 143, at 154. In the South West Africa
Advisory Opinion, States respected the ICJ Advisory Opinion even though it was
not binding; states refrained from trading with South Africa due to its illegal
occupation of Nambia. ROSENNE vol. 3, supra note 211, AT 1700. For the actual ICJ
opinion, see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1970 I.C.J. 78
117-19 (June 21) (describing
the obligations on states to refrain from trading with South Africa). Article 59 of the
ICJ Statute provides that judgments in contentious cases are only binding on the
parties before the ICJ in that particular proceeding. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art.
59. There is no stare decisis jurisprudence in the ICJ. See id. Thus, advisory
opinions have the same legal effect on States that a judgment in a contentious case
has, when States are not parties to that particular contentious case. See id.
Although, as discussed in the next section, an important benefit of advisory opinions
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C. Advisory opinion developing internationallaw regarding
Palestine

Advisory opinions have had a significant impact on the
development of international law. 21 9 Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ
Statute allows the ICJ to use judicial decisions to decide disputes,
"subject to the provisions of Article 59.",220 Therefore, advisory
opinions and judgments in contentious cases both demonstrate the
status of international law on a particular issue, and are useful towards
the development of that issue in international law.
If UNESCO requested an advisory opinion concerning the
sovereignty of Bethlehem, which inextricably would involve the
question of statehood, then Palestine's ability to join the UN or the
ICJ Statute may be improved. While such an opinion would not be
binding, an ICJ pronouncement on Palestine would give guidance to
the international community. While the process of developing
international law may not appear to be an expedient solution to the
Palestinian people or supporters regarding Palestinian statehood, an
advisory opinion would serve to develop the law concerning
Palestinian statehood, and perhaps provide guidance to the GA on the
issue.
V. CONCLUSION

Palestine's access to the ICJ greatly hinges on the SC's discretion.
All three avenues that Palestine can take to bring a contentious case to
the ICJ involve the SC. ICJ Statute Article 35(2) is the most likely
path for Palestine to reach the ICJ because it involves only one
dispute, and therefore the SC may open the ICJ to Palestine depending
on the subject matter of the proceeding. Article 35(2) does not
implicate UN membership or allow Palestine to bring any dispute
before the ICJ.2 2 1 But again, the other State Palestine wishes to bring

is the effect that advisory opinions have on the development of international law.
See infra Part III.C.
219. ICJ COMMENTARY ART. 65, supra note 191, at 1622.

220. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 38, para. 1
221. See U.N. Charter, art 35, para. 2.
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the dispute against must consent to ICJ jurisdiction. 222 Thus, even if
the SC approved Palestine's Article 35(2) bid, the opposing State may
choose to reject ICJ jurisdiction, and Palestine would then have no
judicial recourse.
If Palestine did appear before the ICJ, Palestine would have to be
a State, which would strengthen the argument that Palestine should
also be a UN Member State. 223 This likely consequence could,
however, discourage the SC from granting an Article 35(2) bid
because of the causal chain leading to statehood, and subsequently
increased pressure for UN membership, which may result.
Because Palestine's ability to bring a contentious case is limited,
the efficacy of advisory opinions involving Palestine becomes the
central issue with respect to Palestine's involvement with the ICJ.
The ICJ has demonstrated that it is willing to address an advisory
request dealing with Palestine.22 4 But, what will be the practical
outcome of such an opinion? If the international community, and
more importantly the SC, is not willing to address violations of
international law described by the ICJ, what effect will another
advisory opinion actually have?
The United States, by having permanent veto power in the SC,
plays an essential role in formal enforcement of ICJ judgments and
advisory opinions. 225 If a world leader is not complying with ICJ
decisions, or addressing violations of international law, then the UN
and the world should reconsider the ICJ's effectiveness. Do the SC
and the United States judicial settlements of international disputes
remain aspirational goals? Or do they want to empower the ICJ to
settle more disputes effectively? If effective dispute resolution is the

222. S.C. Res. 9, supra note 18, para. 2; see ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 35,
para. 2.
223. If the SC were to grant Palestine access to the ICJ under Article 35(2),
such approval could strengthen Palestine's bid for UN membership, because only
States may appear before the ICJ. See ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 34.
224. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
225. See UN Charter art. 27, para. 2. The United States has already
jeopardized the efficacy of the ICJ, by its recent non-compliance with the ICJ Avena
judgment. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 529 (2008) (holding that the United
States did not have to enforce an ICJ judgment domestically); Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol44/iss1/4

40

Whitman: Palestine's Statehood and Ability to Litigate in the Internationa

2013] PALESTINE'S STATEHOOD AND ABILITY TO LITIGATE IN ICJ 113
goal, then the international community should allow Palestine access
to the ICJ, and comply with ICJ judgments and advisory opinions. If
effective dispute resolution is not the goal, then it begs the question,
are ICJ decisions merely "the mon[e]y of fools[?]" 226
CharlesF. Whitman*

226.

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 29 (Richard Tuck, ed. 1651).

ICJ

decisions can still contribute to the corpus of international law, elaborated
sometimes in other forums, including national ones, even if, ICJ decisions are not
fully enforced.
*
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